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Abstract
This paper presents new data, in the form of four indices, on liberalization policies
and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices are
combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze
both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications policies. We find that
liberalization policies are negatively associated with the degree to which countries have an
interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan ideology of reforming countries per se. We
also find that countries where the institutional endowment constrains less the behaviour of
the executive bodies, and countries with a stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly
independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of independent
regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account
the endogeneity of regulatory independence.
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DETERMINANTS AND IMPACT (1)
Introduction
The last years of the twentieth century were very rich in reform initiatives in the
telecommunications sector. Many countries introduced private ownership of the dominant
operators, liberalized at least some segments of the industry and introduced new regulatory
authorities. Regulatory reform has, however, many dimensions and takes different forms
across countries. 
The objective of this study is to measure the reform processes taking into account
such multi-dimensionality, and to analyze both the determinants and the impact of reform
initiatives. We focus on liberalization policies (in particular, the degree to which market
opening or deregulation policies are asymmetric, or biased in favour of entrants) and the
degree of independence (vis-à-vis their governments) of regulatory authorities. We present
four new indices, two for asymmetric deregulation and two for independence. They
summarize information on a large number of original variables relevant to these policy areas.
Although there is a broad consensus among scholars and international institutions
(such as the World Bank, the OECD, the International Telecommunications Union, the
European Commission) that opening up the telecommunications sector to competition is both
possible and beneficial for social welfare, the precise nature of this liberalization process is
still controversial. Many of the controversial issues can be summarized in one question: to
what extent should the liberalization policy favour entrants relative to incumbents? In other
words, how biased or asymmetric should regulation be in the market-opening phase?
Incumbent operators have huge incumbency advantages in most countries and enjoy
significant scope economies, since they operate in several segments of the industry. However
they also carry the burden of funding universal service and are the main providers of
infrastructure. Asymmetric regulation may lead to regulators favouring certain competitors
rather than more competition, allowing the entry of inefficient firms and imposing unnecessary
constraints on incumbents.
Much the same can be said of the related issue of regulatory independence. Although
scholars and international institutions advocate the establishment of independent regulators,
(1) We thank Sandra Jódar for excellent research assistance. Support from the “Public Sector Private Sector”
Research Centre at IESE Business School is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Lars-Hendrik Röller,
Jordi Jaumandreu, Joan Ramon Borrell, Daniel Montolio and Astrid Jung for their detailed comments. The
paper also benefitted from discussions at a CEPR Workshop in Madrid, at the I International Industrial
Organization Conference in Boston, at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and at the Barcelona
Workshop on Industrial and Public Economics (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona-Universitat de Barcelona).there is less debate and consensus on the particular attributes of independent regulators and on
how to make independence sustainable. On this, we can draw on the academic literature on
Central Bank independence, which analyzes the problem using aggregate indices that take into
account several dimensions of independence. We take a first step in this direction for telecom
regulators. It is an important step in our view, insofar as the previous empirical literature has
only measured regulator independence as a binary dummy variable. 
We  evaluate the incidence of policies (asymmetric regulation and regulatory
independence) on telecommunications performance, measured by network penetration and
productivity. Comparative assessment of telecommunications reform is an active area of
research (2). Our contribution to this growing literature is threefold:
First, we put our original indices to work, so that our policy variables and our
estimates reflect (for the first time in the case of independence) the fact that both
liberalization and regulatory independence are multi-dimensional phenomena.
Second, along the lines of the recent empirical literature on political economy (3),
we take into account the potential endogeneity of policies.
Third, we use a battery of institutional indices that have not been used in a
combined, systematic way in the rest of the literature (4). By doing so, we are able to assess
the relative explanatory power of each index, and relate them to policies and performance in
telecommunications.
Among our preliminary results, we find that entry policies are negatively associated
with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan
ideology of reforming countries per se. We  also find that countries where the institutional
endowment (5) constrains less the behaviour of the executive bodies are more prone to create
truly independent regulatory agencies. There is weak evidence that the creation of
independent regulatory agencies has a positive effect on network penetration when we take
into account the endogeneity of independence. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the specification strategy, the
hypotheses and the relationship with the existing literature. Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 shows and discusses the results obtained with this data set, and we end up with
some concluding remarks.
2. Model Specification
To  analyze the effect of specific telecommunication policies and regulatory
institutions on industry performance, we use a simple reduced-form model that relates
industry outcomes to a set of supply and demand control variables and the policy and
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(2) See Ros (2002), Wallsten (2001), Fink et al. (2002), Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), Li et al. (2002).
(3) See Besley and Case (2000), Röller and Duso (2001), Beck et al. (2001).
(4) See LaPorta et al. (1999 and 2002), Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), Henisz and Zelner (2000a and b).
(5) The institutional endowment is the set of formal and informal rules that constrain the behaviour of citizens
in society. Examples of elements of the institutional endowment are whether the system is presidential or
parliamentary, the degree of proportionality in the electoral rules, the quality and efficiency of the civil
service or the judiciary, etc. (see Levy and Spiller, 1996).institutional variables of interest (equation (i) below). This specification takes into account
the special features of the telecommunications sector. 
When confronted with the decision to open the industry to competition, the entry
barriers faced by new operators are a decisive factor that has to be taken into account. Policy
makers may use a number of tools to favour the entrants. Hence the policy variable,
measured with an asymmetric deregulation index, will reflect the extent to which
telecommunications policies are biased in favour of entrants relative to incumbents (a larger
value of the index will indicate a more asymmetric policy). The sign of the parameter
corresponding to this policy variable is a matter of controversy. Some authors have criticized
the policies that facilitate the entry of new firms, and argued that this policy hurts the
performance of the industry since, by constraining the behaviour of the incumbents,
economic efficiency is hampered due to the insufficient exploitation of scope economies and
the reduction of the pace of innovation. An institutional variable will capture the effect of
regulatory independence on industry performance.
Since there may be unobserved heterogeneity in the form of policies and institutions
being correlated with omitted variables that are also correlated with performance variables,
we will also estimate an equation for the policy and institutional variables (equation (ii)).
The specification we use is the following:
(i) q = g (Demand, Costs, Market Structure, s) + v
(ii)        s = h (Political Institutions, Interest groups, q–1...) + u
where q are the industry outcomes and s are the policy and institutional variables to be
explained; h and g are functions and u and v error terms. The set of variables s includes both
market-opening policies and the independence of regulatory institutions. In equation (ii) we
include lagged performance variables to take into account the potential causal link between
better industry outcomes and better future policies.
In equation (i), the original policy variables are considered as potentially
endogenous and we use instrumental variables (using the insights gained from the estimation
of equation (ii)) to solve the problem of the correlation of the explanatory variable with the
error term. It has been suggested that the use of political variables (following Besley and
Case, 2000) as instruments may help to achieve consistent estimators in the presence of
endogeneity. Indeed, our specification boils down to tackling the endogeneity issue through
the use of instrumental variables, such as political variables, both for policies (in this case,
deregulation policies in telecommunications) and regulatory institutions (in this case, the
independence of the telecom regulator). (6) 
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(6) Previous studies fail to take into account the endogeneity of policies. However, Röller and Duso (RD, 2002)
undertake an insightful exercise using political variables as instruments and find that the results of the previous
literature on the effects of deregulation (particularly the OECD studies) are no longer valid.  However, they
treat regulatory institutions as exogenous, whereas, at least in telecommunications, they are as endogenous as
liberalization policies themselves, and are often decided upon at the same time. Moreover, among the variables
that explain the policy choice they do not include interest groups, which happen to be an important
determinant of liberalization and regulatory reform in other studies (see Henisz and Zelner, 2000b). In equation (i) it is also very important not to omit any regressor that has a
simultaneous and independent influence on policies, regulatory institutions and outcomes (for
example, institutional indices of political risk, expropriation risk, political constraints, etc.).
In econometric terms, one must have a regressor that is correlated with policies, and use as
instrumental variable the part of this variable that explains policies (and institutions) and not
directly the economic outcomes that one wants to analyze. The unobservable variables that
may affect both policies and outcomes must be controlled for. This is particularly important
in equation (i), since this is a reduced-form equation that summarizes the supply and demand
equations that determine the market equilibrium.
With this specification strategy in mind, we test a number of hypotheses derived
from the literature on political economy and regulation.
Hypothesis 1) Market-opening policies are negatively associated with the
interventionist tradition of each country, and positively related to the weight of interest
groups and the partisan ideology of the reforming country.
First, policies are typically associated with institutional traditions. Deregulation
policies will be more ambitious in countries with a less interventionist tradition (LaPorta et al.,
1999 and 2002). Second, many policies have been observed to be partisan, i.e. different
political parties, since they represent different constituencies, will implement different policies
(Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995). Right-wing coalitions/governments, according to this,
emphasizing free markets rather than redistributive policies, will be more prone to deregulate
and create an environment that is favourable to private investment in telecommunications. And
third, policies will be influenced by interest groups, which compete in the political arena to
obtain favourable policies (see Peltzman, 1976, and Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
Hypothesis 2) The setting up of truly independent regulatory agencies is a policy
decision itself, which depends on the institutional endowment of each country and the interest
of dominant interest groups in the outcomes of this institutional setting relative to the
alternatives.
The explanatory variables for equation (i) will include a number of institutional
indices. These political variables influence the choice of policies (market-opening policies
as well as regulatory institutions). These institutional indices will be used also in equation
(ii), and could in some cases also have a direct influence on market outcomes. Using this
specification, one can test, for example, whether regulatory independence is necessary or
redundant (and hence socially too expensive) once the country has other ways to enforce
contracts and credibly commit to stable policies. Levy and Spiller (1996) and Henisz and
Zelner (2000b) argue that the creation of independent agencies is one among several options
available to countries that want to commit credibly not to expropriate the sunk investments
that characterize network industries. Whether this option will be exercised or not depends on
the institutional endowment and the structure of interest groups.
Hypothesis 3) Market-opening policies have a positive effect on productivity and
independent agencies have a positive effect on investment.
There is a general consensus that competition in the non-natural monopoly segments
of telecommunications is both possible and beneficial for social welfare, especially through
improvements in incentives and productivity. Some scholars think, however, that there is a thin
line that should not be crossed between promoting competition and protecting particular
competitors that may not be as efficient as the incumbent firms. In addition to this argument,
4these scholars also warn against the danger of expropriating the dominant operators’ sunk
investments in infrastructures (7). Other scholars emphasize the potential for strategic
delegation to relatively pro-industry regulators, in an analogy with strategic Rogoff delegation
to conservative central bankers in monetary policy (Levine et al., 2002). Pro-industry
regulators (or regulators who have a duty to behave in a “pro-industry” way) would not
expropriate sunk investments.
3. Data
3.1. Telecommunications policy variables
We collected data on a number of original variables reflecting telecommunications
policies and institutions in 1998 for 37 countries. This new data set, and the way we
summarize it through indices, is one of the main contributions of our work. The description
and measurement technique of these original variables can be found in Appendix 1. We
aggregated the original variables in 4 indices, two for asymmetric deregulation and two for
independence. These aggregation techniques are summarized below and more detail is
provided in Appendix 2. The values that the indices take for each country can be found in
Appendix 3. The construction of the indices can be easily replicated. Alternatively, the
original variables can be combined in different ways according to the purposes of other
researchers. We make the data on the observations for the original variables available. 
Data have been collected from web pages, legislative texts published by the different
regulatory authorities, documents and working papers of the OECD and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), studies carried out on behalf of the European Commission,
and articles from specialized journals. 
The two indices on asymmetric deregulation policies (entry and entry(pc)) aggregate
information on the following policies:
– The degree to which entry in the industry is subject to investment conditions of
any kind.
– The average of the number of mobile providers in 1996 and 1997.
– The method of spectrum allocation.
– The existence of number portability in fixed and mobile telephony.
– The existence of carrier selection and carrier pre-selection in local, long-distance
and international telephony.
– The rules governing mobile to mobile and fixed to mobile interconnection rates.
– The availability of local loop unbundling and rules governing access to
alternative infrastructure.
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(7) See Sidak and Spulber (1997).We  have associated a metric to each of these variables, with the lowest value for
policies that are less favourable to ease of entry and a higher value to policies that are more
favourable. These values have been aggregated into two indices, namely entry and entry(pc).
The difference between entry and entry(pc) is that whereas the former is an ad hoc index that
just adds up the values in all the “asymmetric deregulation” dimensions that have been
considered, the latter is chosen among four new variables that summarize all the observations
in these dimensions using principal components analysis. The new variable reflects mostly
the introduction of number portability in fixed telephony, the absence of investment
conditions for entrants, the presence of long-distance and international carrier pre-selection,
and the introduction of local loop unbundling. For this reason, we think that this new variable
describes well the degree to which regulation is asymmetrically biased in favour of entrants.
Of the 37 countries for which we collected information, 33 had a separate regulatory
agency in operation in 1998 (all except Chile, Japan, New Zealand and Israel). Of these, 18
had set up the regulatory agency prior to 1997. In this year, as many as 11 agencies started
operating, and four of them started in 1998. The oldest agency is the FCC of the US, which
started operating in 1934, and the next one at the national level was not created until 1976 in
Canada. All the others were created in the 1990s. Therefore, the establishment of separate
regulatory agencies is a very recent phenomenon.
The two indices on regulatory independence (indep and indep(pc)) are based on
information which covers the following issues:
– The degree to which the regulatory agency is responsible for a number of
policies, including: licensing, interconnection, tariffs, scarce resource allocation
(such as spectrum frequencies and numeration plans), and universal service.
– The degree to which its funding sources are independent of the government’s
discretion.
– The rules of appointment of the head of the agency or its board.
– The length of the term in office of the head of the office or the members of the
board.
– The rules about obligations to report to the government, parliament or some other
official body.
We  have associated a metric to each of these variables, with the lowest value for
policies that give less independence to the office and a higher value to policies that give more
independence. These values have been aggregated in two indices, indep and indep(pc). The
difference between indep and indep(pc) is that whereas the former is an ad hoc index that just
adds up the values in all the “independence” dimensions that have been considered, the latter
is chosen out of the three new variables that summarize all the observations in these
dimensions using  principal components analysis. This new variable reflects mostly the
regulator’s capacity to set tariffs and interconnection charges and, to a lesser extent, its
independence of the government in terms of funding and length of term in office.
63.2. Telecommunications performance variables
Data on the performance of the telecommunications industry was obtained from the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database. We focus on performance as
measured by network penetration and productivity data.
Network penetration is described as main lines per 100 inhabitants (linesinhab). We
focus on the level of this variable in 1998 and 2001. This is the last year available. We also
consider the rate of growth since 1998, the year for which we computed the policy measures.
Productivity is measured as subscribers per employee and main lines per employee.
For both we use the levels in 2000 (subworker and linesworker), the last year available, and
the growth in the subscribers per worker variable between 1998 and 2000. When these
variables are lagged, the data correspond to 1994.
3.3. Political and institutional variables
We  have collected a number of political variables on the general quality of
government, interest groups, ideology, institutions and the tradition of each country with
regard to the state’s involvement in the economy.
Our ideological variable ideology has a value of one if the largest party in the
government was a right-wing party as of January, 1st 1997, and a value of zero if the largest
party had any other orientation. We elaborated this variable from the original Beck et al.’s
(2001) data set (8).
We  have two variables reflecting the interventionist tradition of each country, i.e.,
the degree to which the state has an inclination to intervene in economic matters. Both of
them are collected from LaPorta’s web page at the Economics Department of Harvard
University. One of them, legal, reports whether the legal origin of the country belongs to
English Civil Law or to other more interventionist traditions, such as socialist, French
Common Law, German Common Law or Scandinavian Common Law.  LaPorta et al. (1999)
argue that this variable proxies for the degree of interventionism of the state in economic
matters, since English Civil Law was set up to protect the owners from the sovereign,
whereas traditions such as French Common Law were designed to reinforce the role of the
state. The socialist tradition would be an extreme case of interventionism and the other two
would be intermediate cases between English and French. We give a value of 0 to 4 in the
order of more interventionist to less (so the order is socialist, French, German, Scandinavian,
English). Moreover, this variable is interesting as a potential instrument because it is
exogenous and uncorrelated with performance in telecommunications, since the legal origin
is usually associated with colonization or conquest. The other measure of interventionism,
procedures, is the number of steps that a new business has to take in order to start operating,
and it is obtained from LaPorta et al. (2002).
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(8) The original data set on ideologies by Beck et al. labels the largest party in each country’s government as left,
center, right or non-applicable. However, the way they allocate the left or center label to different largest
parties seemed to us somehow inaccurate. For example, they attach the label left both to the Cuban and to the
Clinton government in the US, whereas the Prodi administration in Italy and the center-left ruling coalition in
Chile are allocated the Center label. The way they allocate the right label seemed to us more clear cut.We have some variables reflecting the weight of some interest groups in the policies
of interest, although this clearly is an area that can be expanded in future research. We have
the number of telecommunications workers divided by the overall population (staff) as a
measure of the size of the incumbent, and the percentage of urban population (urbanpop) as
a measure of the size of a social group demanding new services and hence a priori in favour
of telecom liberalization (9).
We have three variables reflecting the general quality of government, obtained from
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002). These are regqual, goveff and rulelaw, and they are composite
indices measuring, respectively, the general quality of government, government effectiveness
and the rule of law.
And we have one additional variable, instconst, which is an index of institutional
constraints on executive bodies, first used in Henisz and Zelner (2000). We use the average
for this index between 1945 and 1975. This index gives a measure of the ability of
governments to commit themselves or their successors not to expropriate investments.
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix of these institutional and political variables for
our observations, plus our two indices of regulator independence, indep and indep(pc). The
table clearly shows that these variables are measuring different phenomena, and that not
taking some of them into account may lead us to omit some important influences in the
analysis. The rule of law index, the government effectiveness index and the regulatory quality
index are highly positively correlated. The legal origin and the number of procedures to set
up a new business are highly negatively correlated. Surprisingly, our two indices of
regulatory independence are not highly correlated with any of the other institutional indices.
We tackle this issue more in depth below, when we discuss our preliminary results.
Table 1. Correlation between sector-specific and general regulation variables
regqual indep indep(pc) goveff rulelaw legal instconst procedures
regqual 1
indep 0.1078    1
indep(pc) 0.0493    0.7080 1
goveff 0.9221    0.1246 0.0093    1
rulelaw 0.8743   –0.009 –0.087    0.9285    1
legal 0.4439   –0.013 –0.275 0.4823 0.4963 1
instconst 0.3558   –0.027 –0.161 0.4971 0.5447 0.6194 1
procedures –0.639   –0.028 0.0845 –0.648 –0.664 –0.775 -0.6393 1
We also have data on the GDP per capita in 1998 in dollar terms to control for the
level of development in each country, which may also influence telecom performance. There
is a high correlation between regulatory quality (and also government effectiveness and rule
of law) and GDP per capita. The following graph points to a non-linear positive association
between the two:
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(9) Both measures correspond to 1994.4. Econometric results
4.1. The determinants of endogenous policies
Tables 2a-d show that legal origins and lagged performance are significant
determinants of the entry index. Our estimations are consistent with the hypothesis that less
interventionist societies tend to liberalize more, and impose a regulation which favours the
incumbents to a lesser degree. Societies with better telecommunications sectors also tend to
liberalize more. Interestingly, however, the principal components index of asymmetric
deregulation, entry(pc), did not show any significant pattern.
Table 2a. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation Table 2b. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation 
OLS estimates t-statistic OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable entry Dependent Variable entry
intercept –0.6412943    –0.74    intercept –0.718073 –0.12
legal  0.4984411    2.97    legal  0.5015454 3.04
ideology –0.1707091     –0.34    subsworker (lagged) 0.0085311 2.85
urbanpop 0.015199    0.95    # Observations 37














lTable 2c. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation Table 2d. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation
OLS estimates t-statistic OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable entry Dependent Variable entry
intercept –0.0558621    –0.09   intercept
legal  0.5419218    3.27   procedures –0.1394231 –2.60
linesworker (lagged) –0.0086778     2.61   linesworker (lagged) 0.0085237 2.24
# Observations 37   # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.3599 R-Squared 0.3449
Ideology, however, appears to have no impact on the decision to liberalize, as shown
in Table 3. Telecommunications liberalization does not appear to be a partisan policy.
However, this is not incompatible with some aspects of the reform process being partisan. For
example, privatization of the incumbent could be a partisan policy, with right-wing parties
being more inclined to privatize. But our composite indices do not single out individual
policy dimensions, and hence we are not able to make any inference on them.
Table 3. Equation (ii) Asymmetric regulation
OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable entry
Intercept –0.0503046      –0.08   
Legal 0.542201    3.22   
Ideology –0.0680929    –0.14   
linesworker (lagged) 0.0087813    2.54   
# Observations 37
R-Squared 0.3603
As we saw in Table 1, our two indices of regulatory independence are not highly
correlated with any of the other institutional indices, and in particular they are not correlated
with overall regulatory quality. We interpret this as evidence that formal regulatory
independence is compatible with different levels of general regulatory or institutional quality.
However, this does not mean that regulatory independence does not show any systematic
pattern. Our regression results on the determinants of independence (see Tables 4a-b) show
that independence is a substitute for other ways to achieve commitment not to expropriate. In
particular, the index of constraints on the executive appears to be negatively and significantly
related to the creation of truly independent regulatory agencies. The sign of the ideological
dummy and of the rule of law variable are also negative although not significant. This is
consistent with the Levy and Spiller (1996) view of regulatory commitment and credibility.
Countries achieve regulatory commitment not to expropriate investment, yielding good
results in terms of industry performance, if they are able to create credible institutions that are
well adapted to the institutional endowment of each country. Since institutional endowments
vary across countries, the way different countries set up commitment institutions will vary.
Take the cases of the UK and Chile, two countries that were among the first to successfully
privatize their telecommunications incumbents and introduce competition. The UK, with its
centralized system and majoritarian government, has very few constraints on the executive’s
10behaviour, so that new and special institutions, such as an independent regulator, must be put
in place to achieve commitment.
Table 4a. Equation (ii) Regulatory independence Table 4b. Equation (ii) Regulatory independence
OLS estimates t-statistic OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable indep(pc) Dependent Variable indep(pc)
Intercept 0.5915471    1.11    Intercept 5.895357   4.52  
ideology –0.3931289    –1.18    ideology –1.139659     –1.40  
staff 6.003888    2.65    staff 15.28706    2.75 
rulelaw –0.4127745    –1.52    rulelaw –1.0595    –1.59  
instconst –0.233859    –2.00    instconst –0.3805054     –1.33   
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.2547 R-Squared 0.2545
In addition to this, the way the independent regulator is set up takes advantage of
other features of the British institutional endowment, such as the respect for contracts and the
independence of the judiciary. In Chile, however, with a presidential system and coalition
governments, it is very difficult to change legislation, so that commitment is achieved
through very detailed legislation, which, as thought at the time of reform, would make setting
up a regulatory agency redundant and hence not cost-effective if there is any cost to
independence (for example, in terms of political legitimacy or other costs to the political
principals). Hence Chile is one of the few countries in our data set that does not even have a
separate telecom regulator.
Quite robustly in our regressions, the effect of the size of the incumbent (as
measured by the number of telecommunications staff some years before the reform) has a
positive and statistically significant effect on the decision to create a truly independent
regulatory agency. This is a surprising result, and we interpret it as the incumbent preferring
an independent regulator in the face of the coming liberalization, which will inevitably be
associated with more interest group competition. This is consistent with the view of Henisz
and Zelner (2000) on the electricity industry, where they show that incumbents lobby for the
creation of constraints on investment expropriation if they foresee strong interest group
competition.
To sum up, the data do not reject the part of hypothesis 1 that predicts that market
opening policies are related to the non-interventionist tradition of countries, nor the part of
hypothesis 2 that predicts that regulator independence is determined by the institutional
endowment of countries. We also find support for the part of hypothesis 2 that predicts that
independence is associated with interest group pressure. In this case, we find that countries
with a larger incumbent are more prone to create truly independent agencies. We conjecture
that large incumbents may find that independent specialized regulators (with staff members
probably recruited among previous incumbent staff) may be more easily captured than
governments, and/or that large incumbents may have more to lose without an independent
regulator, if the independent regulator, as a credible commitment device, contributes to
alleviate the under-investment problem. This is so because larger incumbents have larger
sunk investments in infrastructures.
114.2 The effects of policies
We  first investigate the determinants of telecommunications network penetration
(lines per 100 inhabitants and growth in lines per 100 inhabitants). These are the endogenous
variables usually focused on in the studies that work with the ITU data set. 
The following graph suggests the existence of a positive association between entry
policies and telecom penetration:
In the regressions results, although the entry index is not significantly related to
growth in network penetration, it is significantly related to network penetration in 2001 (see
Tables 5a-b) if liberalization is taken as exogenous. This significant relationship disappears
once the endogeneity of liberalization is taken into account.
Table 5a. Equation (i) Network penetration Table 5b. Equation (i) Network penetration
OLS estimates t-statistic IV estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesinhab Dependent Variable linesinhab
intercept 6.223462   2.37   intercept 6.813583 1.63
gdpcap 0.001765 15.33    gdpcap 0.001781 11.92
entry 2.173517 2.47    entry 1.824838 0.84
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.9012 R-Squared 0.9002










yThe  entry variable shows the same pattern in determining the telecom network
penetration, as reported in Tables 6a-b, if we control for the effect of institutional variables
such as regulatory quality. Hence OLS overestimates the contribution of the entry variable.
Table 6a. Equation (i) Network penetration Table 6b. Equation (i) Network penetration
OLS estimates t-statistic IV estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesinhab Dependent Variable linesinhab
intercept 5.893217 2.26  intercept 6.993702 1.65
gdpcap 0.0016269 10.86  gdpcap 0.0016312 10.69
entry 1.725991 1.87   regqual 5.925041 1.26
regqual 4.910904 1.41 entry 0.9316063 0.36
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.9068 R-Squared 0.9042
Instrumented: entry  /Instrument: legal
The independence of the regulator does not appear to be a significant determinant of
network penetration with OLS, but it becomes significant at the 10% level when we take into
account the endogeneity of independence through Instrumental Variable estimation, as shown
in Tables 7a-d.
Table 7a. Equation (i) Network penetration Table 7b. Equation (i) Network penetration
OLS estimates t-statistic OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesinhab Dependent Variable linesinhab
intercept 8.285623 2.13   intercept 9.937633 4.16
gdpcap 0.0018636 16.00   gdpcap 0.0018595 15.93
indep 0. 2909294 0.49  indep(pc) 0.8972316 0.541
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.8843 R-Squared 0.8848
Table 7c. Equation (i) Network penetration Table 7d. Equation (i) Network penetration
IV estimates t-statistic IV estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesinhab Dependent Variable linesinhab
intercept –15.82578 –0.99 intercept 10.61103 3.17
gdpcap 0.0017327 7.06  gdpcap 0.0018608 11.01
indep 5.169759 1.67  indep(pc) 8.359294 1.72
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.6096 R-Squared 0.7820
Instrumented: indep Instrumented: indep(pc)  
Instruments: staff, instconst Instruments: staff, instconst
13Next, we look at the determinants of productivity in the telecommunications sector,
as measured by subscribers per employee and lines per employee. The principal components
index of asymmetric deregulation has a negative impact on productivity (measured as
subscribers per employee) in levels, although the significance of this estimate declines as we
add variables. The same happens when productivity is measured as lines per employee,
although the regression results are not reported here. 
Table 8. Equation (i) Productivity
OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable subsworker
intercept 311.5764    4.72   
gdpcap 0.0014085    0.33   
entry(pc) –80.46346    –2.05   
regqual 133.5519     1.39   
# Observations 37
R-Squared 0.1862
We checked for the effect of the ad hoc entry index on productivity, first with OLS
and next with IV estimation using the legal index as instrumental variable, without any
significant results.
Finally, we see in Tables 9a-d that regulatory independence has a negative or non-
significant (when appropriately instrumented) effect on productivity.
To sum up this part of the empirical analysis, we find weak support for the part of
hypothesis 3 that predicts that independence contributes to alleviate the under-investment
problem.
Table 9a. Equation (i) Productivity Table 9b. Equation (i) Productivity
OLS estimates t-statistic OLS estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesworker Dependent Variable subworker
intercept 218.8331    4.69     intercept 472.6807    4.28   
gdpcap 0.0026235    1.85   gdpcap 0.0050013    1.49   
indep –13.5829    –2.00   indep –24.21684    –1.51 
entry 7.860585    0.72   entry 4.929714    0.19   
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared 0.2087 R-Squared 0.1238
14Table 9c. Equation (i) Productivity Table 9d. Equation (i) Productivity
IV estimates t-statistic IV estimates t-statistic
Dependent Variable linesworker Dependent Variable subworker
intercept 342.9504    2.23    intercept 774.7448     2.25  
gdpcap 0.005167    2.19    gdpcap 0.010074    1.90  
indep –21.675    –0.75    indep –52.31917    –0.80   
entry –42.40925    –1.25 entry –90.9437    –1.19  
# Observations 37 # Observations 37
R-Squared R-Squared
Instrumented: entry, indep Instrumented: entry, indep
Instruments: legal, staff  Instruments: legal, staff
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented new data, in the form of four indices, on entry policies
and the independence of regulators for a cross-section of countries. These indices take into
account the multi-dimensionality of policies and institutions. In the case of independence,
this moves the empirical literature on regulation one step closer to the empirical literature on
Central Bank independence in monetary policy, where the use of independence indices as
opposed to dummy variables has become common practice.
These indices were combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional
and political data to quantify both the determinants and the impact of telecommunications
policies. We found that liberalization policies which favour entrants are negatively associated
with the degree to which countries have an interventionist tradition, but not with the partisan
ideology of reforming countries per se. We also found that countries where the institutional
endowment constrains less the behaviour of the executive bodies, and countries with a
stronger incumbent, are more prone to create truly independent regulatory agencies. The
effect of the institutional endowment is consistent with the previous literature on regulatory
institutions. The positive association between incumbent size and independent regulators has
not been observed before and may seem puzzling. We conjecture that large incumbents may
find that independent specialized regulators (with staff members probably recruited among
previous incumbent staff) may be more easily captured than governments, and/or that large
incumbents may have more to lose without an independent regulator, if the independent
regulator (as a commitment device) contributes to alleviate the under-investment problem.
This is so because larger incumbents have larger sunk investments in infrastructures.
We found weak evidence that the creation of truly independent regulatory agencies
has a positive effect on network penetration when we take into account the endogeneity of
independence. There is no evidence, with this preliminary data set, of a significant effect
(positive or negative) of market opening policies on any of the performance variables used in
this study. However, a positive significant effect on network penetration would be predicted
with the same data set if the endogeneity of market opening policies was not taken into
account. This illustrates (along the lines of Röller and Duso, 2002, and Besley and Case,
2000) that very different results may be (incorrectly) obtained if the endogeneity of policies
is not taken into account. 
15Despite the importance of creating politically sustainable regulatory systems, the
establishment of separate regulatory agencies in telecommunications is a very recent
phenomenon. 
Equivalently, it is probably too early to reach any final conclusion on the effects of
different market opening policies. Our results on the determinants of policies and institutions,
however, point to some systematic relationships that fit well with some of the theoretical
literature on institutions. Further research may also explore in a more systematic way the
interaction between market opening policies and institutional design.
16References
Alesina, Alberto; Rosenthal, Howard (1995), Partisan Politics, Divided Government and The
Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Beck, Thorsten; Clarke, George; Groff, Alberto; Keefer, Phillip; Walsh, Patrick (2001), New
Tools in Comparative Political Economy, World Bank Economic Review, 15: 165-176.
Besley, Timothy; Case, Anne (2000), Unnatural Experiments? Estimating The Incidence of
Endogenous Policies, The Economic Journal, 110: F672-F694.
Boylaud, Oliver; Nicoletti, Giuseppe (2000), Regulation, Market Structure and Performance
in Telecommunications, OECD Econ. Dept. working paper 237, Paris.
Fink, Carsten; Mattoo, Aaditya; Rathindran, Randeep (2002), An Assessment of
Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries, The World Bank, mimeo.
Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan (2001), Special Interest Politics, Cambridge: The
MIT Press.
Henisz, Witold J.; Zelner, Bennet A. (2000a), The Institutional Environment for
Telecommunications Investment, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
Henisz, Witold J.; Zelner, Bennet A. (2000b), Political Constraints, Interest Group
Competition and Infrastructure Investment in The Electric Utility Industry: A Cross-
National Study, mimeo.
Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart (2002), Growth without Governance, The World Bank,
mimeo.
La Porta, Rafael; López de Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert  (1999), The
Quality of Government, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1): 222-279.
La Porta, Rafael; López de Silanes, Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert (2002), The
Regulation of Entry, mimeo.
Levine, Paul; Stern, Jon; Trillas, Francesc (2002), Independent Utility Regulators: Lessons
from Monetary Policy, mimeo.
Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T. (1996), Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative
Studies of Telecommunications, Cambridge University Press.
Li, Wei; Zhen-Wei Qiang, Christine; Colin Xu, Lixin (2002), The Political Economy of
Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from The Telecommunications
Sector, Journal of Comparative Economics, 30(3).
Peltzman, Sam (1976), Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of Law and
Economics, 19: 211-240.
Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Duso, Tommaso (2001), Towards a Political Economy of Industrial
Organization: Empirical regularities from Deregulation, mimeo.
17Ros, Agustín J. (2002), The Impact of The Regulatory Process and Price Cap Regulation in
Latin American Telecommunications Markets, mimeo.
Sidak, Gregory; Spulber, Daniel (1997), Deregulatory Takings and The Regulatory Contract,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wallsten, Scott J. (2001), An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization,




Original policy variables. Definition and measurement (1)
Investment conditions imposed on entrants: equals 0 if entry to the industry is subject to
investment conditions of any kind and 1 otherwise. If there are no entrants, the value is set to 0.
Average Number of Mobile Providers: average of the number of providers that were in
operation in 1996 and 1997.
Number Portability. Fixed Telephony: equals 0 if number portability in fixed telephony is not
possible and 1 otherwise.
Carrier Selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier selection of the local operator is not possible and
1 otherwise.
Carrier Selection. Long Distance and International: equals 0 if carrier selection of the long
distance operator (national & international) is not possible and 1 otherwise.
Carrier pre-selection. Local: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of the local operator is not
possible and 1 otherwise.
Carrier pre-selection. Long distance and international: equals 0 if carrier pre-selection of the
long-distance operator (national & international) is not possible and 1 otherwise.
Year of establishment of effective operation: equals 0 if the regulatory authority is a
department of the government and grows from 1 to 64 as the year of establishment goes back
in time.
Private Ownership of the incumbent (%): percentage of the incumbent that is not owned
directly by the government.
Local Loop Unbundling Availability: equals 0 if local loop unbundling is not available and 1
otherwise.
Wireless Local Access licensing: equals 0 if there are no licences for Wireless Local Access
and 1 otherwise.
Cable restrictions imposed on incumbents: equals 0 if incumbents have no restrictions to
cable ownership and 1 otherwise.
Method of Spectrum Allocation: equals 0 if the mobile industry is under monopoly, 1 if the
licensing process is on a “first come first served” basis, 2 if the spectrum allocation is done
through comparative tenders, 3 if it is done through competitive tenders with a financial offer,
and 4 if it is done through auctions.
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(1) Unless otherwise stated, the measurement refers to the situation at the beginning of 1998. The original data
on which the indices are based is available upon request. Appendix 1 (continued)
Licensing: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to grant licences and 0 if it is a function
carried out only by a ministry. If the ministry is the only regulator, this variable is set to 0 as
well.
Interconnection: equals 1 if the regulator has the power to establish and administer
interconnection regimes and 0 in the same situations as in the previous variable.
Tariffs: equals 1 if the regulator can determine regulated tariffs and 0 in the same situations as
in the previous variable.
Scarce Resources: equals 1 if the regulator can administer scarce resources, such as spectrum
frequencies and numeration plans, and 0 in the same situations as before.
Universal Service: equals 1 if the regulator can establish and administer a universal service
and 0 in the same situations as before.
Funding: equals 0 if the regulator gets its funds from the government budget, 1 if it also gets
fees from the operators, and 2 if the funding is only through fees paid by the operators.
Appointed by: equals 0 if the head of the regulatory authority is appointed directly by the
government, 1 if he/she is appointed by the government and the legislature, and 2 if he/she is
appointed only by the legislature. If the regulatory authority is a department of the
government, it takes the value of 0.
Length of term: years of the term in office of the regulator. If the regulatory authority is a
department of the government or its term is not defined, the value is set to 0.
Reporting to: equals 0 if the regulatory authority has to report to the government, 1 if it has to
report to the government and to the legislature, 2 if it has to report only to the legislature and





A2.1. Entry and indep
The indices entry and indep each use a number of original variables in the following
way. First, the original variables are re-coded, so that each of the observations can be
measured on a 0-1 range. This is done by dividing the original metric for each observation by
the maximum value of the variable (for example, if Spain has a value of 2 in “method of
spectrum allocation”, the re-coded value will be 2/4=0.5, where 4 is the maximum value that
this original variable can take). Then the values of all the re-coded original variables used for
the index are added for each country. Hence the final index will have a maximum value equal
to the number of original variables used in its computation.
Entry uses as original variables: Investment conditions imposed on entrants, Average
number of mobile providers, Method of spectrum allocation, Number portability (fixed
telephony), Number portability (mobile telephony), Carrier selection (local), Carrier selection
(long distance and international), Carrier pre-selection (local), Carrier pre-selection (long
distance and international).
Indep uses as original variables: Licensing (excl. Mobile), Interconnection, Tariffs,
Scarce resources, Universal service, Funding, Appointed by, Term, Reporting to, Year of
establishment of effective operation, Private ownership of incumbent.
Indep(pc) and entry(pc)
These indices are computed using the principal components methodology. The
original variables for each index are used to find the linear combinations that minimize the
overall variance.
Indep(pc) uses as original variables: Licensing, Interconnection, Tariffs, Scarce
resources, Universal service, Funding, Appointed by, Length of term, Reporting to. Out of
the three principal components selected, we selected number 1 for ease of interpretation.
Entry(pc) uses as original variables: Investment conditions imposed on entrants,
Average number of mobile providers, Number portability (fixed telephony), Carrier selection
(local), Carrier selection (long distance & international), Carrier pre-selection (local), Carrier
pre-selection (long distance & international), Year of establishment of effective operation (1),
Public ownership of the incumbent, Local loop unbundling availability, Wireless local access
licensing, Cable restrictions imposed on incumbents. Out of four principal components
obtained, we selected number 2 for ease of interpretation.
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(1) “Year of establishment of effective operation” is used here for the principal components entry index,
suggesting that perhaps it may indicate the year in which the liberalization process starts. Both this original
variable and “Public ownership of the incumbent” may be related both to independence and to entry, which
is why we have them in the entry(pc) index and in the indep index. Their loading in the final entry(pc) index
chosen, however, is either negative or negligible.Appendix 2 (continued)
Principal components indices are obtained in both cases as follows: We describe the
total variance of a set of n points (the original variables) in p dimensional space by
introducing a new set of p orthogonal and uncorrelated variates (the new indices). The new
set is formed by taking normalized linear combinations of the original set so that the rth
variate generated has the rth largest variance.
The following tables show the numerical results for the computation of Principal
Components, first for the set of “independence” variables, and second for the set of
“asymmetric deregulation” variables. The figures in the interior cells are the loadings of each




Licensing 0.227 0.656 0.481
Interconnection 0.842 0.232 0.202
Tariffs 0.741 0.414
Scarce resources 0.915
Universal service 0.351 0.181 0.705
Funding 0.732 0.257 0.266
Appointed by 0.128 0.744







imposed on entrants –0.202 –0.504 0.154 –0.686
Average number
of mobile providers 0.330 0.220 0.704 0.131
Number portability
(fixed telephony) –0.315 0.824 0.115
Carrier selection (local) 0.765 0.192 0.165
Carrier selection
(long distance &
international) 0.135 0.196 0.743 0.390
Carrier pre-selection
(local) 0.906 0.262 0.136
Carrier pre-selection
(long distance &
international) 0.373 0.709 0.203
Year of establishment
of effective operation –0.793 –0.225 –0.347
Public ownership
of the incumbent –0.166 –0.859
Local loop
unbundling availability 0.441 0.715 0.143
Wireless local
access licensing 0.270 0.562 0.349 –0.352
Cable restrictions




Values for the indices on liberalization and regulator independence
indep indep(pc) entry entry(pc)
Germany 7,67095 0,19029 5,09184 3,03192
Chile 1 –2,01649 4,059 0,15638
France 4,20381 –0,66522 2,07237 –0,48506
USA 9,38095 0,0352 6,94278 0,853
Spain 5,84762 0,59838 2,13408 –0,59481
Italy 5,85 0,3653 1,89987 –0,92657
Japan 0,35 –2,01649 3,79233 –0,42421
N. Zealand 1 –2,01649 4,64653 –0,98545
UK 6,51429 1,311 4,31309 1,56787
Sweden 6,25714 0,93042 3,08131 –0,41989
Peru 4,40476 0,70353 1,60863 –0,67873
Argentina 4,24762 –0,7008 1,84994 –0,59886
Canada 9,31429 0,72516 6,04781 1,30539
Mexico 3,75143 0,27196 3,37677 0,74609
Venezuela 7,5381 0,19817 1,02202 –0,45261
Brazil 7,84762 0,62186 1,76561 –0,03961
India 0,5619 –1,5399 1,33618 0,19229
Philippines 7,4381 –0,2334 2,5 –0,05405
Singapore 7,08143 0,62973 3,08843 –0,15796
Israel 0,46 –2,01649 1,50674 0,09664
Jordan 7,8381 0,27204 0,97128 –0,48573
Morocco 3,78095 0,24166 0,19388 –0,32733
Ethiopia 5,57088 –0,59084 0,18127 –0,24681
Madagascar 6,62776 0,62199 0,97473 –0,45348
South Africa 7,31429 –0,39637 0,85994 –0,44678
Bulgaria 5,06667 1,62873 1,33426 –0,24087
Finland 4,4501 0,23449 4,14624 3,63491
Denmark 8,0381 0,71002 2,97274 –1,1273
Norway 6,30476 0,81038 2,96901 –0,96191
Portugal 7,77857 0,47087 0,94137 –0,54706
Switzerland 5,47143 –0,52012 1,23732 –0,05314
Australia 4,17762 –1,72753 3,47705 0,46473
Austria 5,51429 0,87485 2,33373 0,03961
Belgium 5,68048 0,41756 1,23472 –0,49076
Ireland 7,33333 –0,37116 1,08901 –0,42951
Luxembourg 3,5619 0,97623 0,32099 –0,48045
Netherlands 6,26676 0,9715 2,30331 0,09933
24